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Abstract: A signiđcant portion of local transportation funding comes from the property tax. ăe tax is conventionally assessed on both land
and buildings, but transportation increases only the value of the land. A more direct and eﬃcient way to fund transportation projects is to
tax land at a higher rate than buildings. ăe lower tax on buildings would allow owners to retain more of the prođts of their investment in
construction, and would be expected to lead to higher development intensity. A partial equilibrium simulation is created for Minneapolis,
Richđeld and Bloomington, Minnesota to determine the intensity eﬀects of various levels of split-rate property taxes for both residential and
nonresidential development. ăe results indicate that split-rate taxes would lead to higher densities for both types of development in all three
cities.
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1 Introduction
ăe accessibility of a property has a substantial value that is
capitalized in the price of the land. Conventional property
taxes capture this value to some extent, but also depend on
the nature of the structures on the property, which do not de-
rive value from transportation access. Funding transportation
with a split-rate property tax, inwhich land is taxed at a higher
rate than buildings, is a more direct way to capture the related
value while also improving the incentive structure for devel-
opers. A parcel of land has a value based on surrounding im-
provements the community has made, and an increase in the
tax on land allows the community to keep a greater portion of
the value generated by public projects. Buildings have value
based on the eﬀort and expense the owners have incurred to
construct them, and a correspondingdecrease in the tax on im-
provements allows property owners to keep more of the value
they have created for themselves.
ăe component of conventional property tax that reĔects
building value creates a disincentive for owners to improve
their properties and results in less construction than would
likely occur in an untaxed market. In contrast, the portion of
the property tax that falls on land has no eﬀect on land sup-
ply. Reducing the tax on buildings thus improves economic
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eﬃciency, while raising the tax on land to maintain revenue
neutrality does not cause a corresponding eﬃciency loss (Co-
hen and Coughlin 2005). An increase in the levy on land also
gives landowners an incentive to develop their properties for a
higher economic purpose; in theory, this discourages the spec-
ulative holding of vacant parcels, as the higher tax rate causes
owners either to develop or to sell to someonewhowill. A cor-
responding decrease in the levy on buildings enables property
owners to commit more funds toward development without
having to account for as great a rise in property tax. Future
urban development is then expected to follow a more central-
ized, compact pattern (Batt 2003). ăis increased density, in
turn, makes the provision of public transit service more feasi-
ble (Parsons Brinckerhoﬀ 1996; Pushkarev and Zupan 1977).
Because the property tax is only partially based on land
value, owners can prođt at the expense of others when the
value of their land increases because of improvements to in-
frastructure or to nearby properties. Transportation projects
can generate land value increases well in excess of their costs,
and to capture a portion of this gain would be suﬃcient to
fund some projects without additional public expenditure
(Batt 2001; Benjamin and Sirmans 1996; Riley 2001). In
Minnesota, property taxes are a primary source of local road
funding, and the ability of cities to raise revenue by other
means is limited (Zhao et al. 2008). Provided that assessments
of property value keep up with the real estate market, taxing
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land at a higher rate strengthens the connection between ben-
eđt from and payment toward transportation facilities. Even
if overall property values fall due to broader economic fac-
tors, the value added by transportation improvements is still
reĔected in land prices.
Adopting a split-rate property tax as a value capturemecha-
nism alters the cost of developing certain areas and aﬀects de-
velopers’ decisions on when, where and how much to build.
ăe purpose of this paper is to simulate the development re-
sponse to split-rate taxes in three sample cities in Minnesota.
Conclusions from previous research on the economic eﬀects
of the tax are discussed along with a summary of previous ap-
plications. ăe data, methodology and results of the simula-
tion are explained next, followed by a discussion of the con-
clusions and limitations.
2 Extent of Use
ăe most prominent applications of split-rate property taxes
in the United States are in several cities in Pennsylvania. Be-
ginning in 1913, the state allowed certain types of cities to as-
sess land value separately from any structures on it and to levy
tax on land at twice the rate of the tax onbuildings. Pittsburgh
and Scranton adopted the split-rate tax at that time. In the
1970s, the diﬀerential was allowed to increase, and the land
rate in Pittsburgh was nearly six times the rate on buildings
before the city reverted to a conventional single-rate property
tax in 2001. Several smaller cities adopted a split rate more re-
cently and continue to use it. Most had experienced economic
downturns and population losses and used the split-rate tax to
create an incentive for redevelopment and new construction
in depressed areas.
A list of Pennsylvania cities taxing land andbuildings at sep-
arate rates as of 2008 is given in Table 1. ăe land and build-
ing rates and the diﬀerential between them vary widely, partly
due to the method of assessment used in Pennsylvania. ăe
estimated market value at the last county-wide reassessment,
or base year value, is multiplied by a predeđned assessment
ratio and then by the tax rate to calculate the amount of the
tax. If the last reassessment was long ago or the assessment
ratio is low, a higher tax rate can compensate. Several other
states, including Maryland and New York, have investigated
the feasibility of allowing certainmunicipalities to enact split-
rate taxes (Hartzok 1997).
Todate, split-rate taxationhas been seen as away to raise ad-
ditional revenue or to facilitate development, rather than as a
speciđc fundingmechanism for transportation projects. Split-
rate taxation is most applicable at the local level, because city
and county governments already levy property taxes, provide
transportation facilities and have an interest in the regulation
of land use. School districts in Pennsylvania are also permitted
to use split-rate taxes, but only two currently do so. ăe ability
of local governments in other states to levy split-rate property
taxes depends on the basis of local taxing power, andmight re-
quire a change in state law. Assessment procedures also diﬀer
by state, but the adoption of a split-rate tax would not require
the use of Pennsylvania’s base-year method.
3 Previous research
Past research on split-rate taxes has been focused largely on
determining their eﬀects on economic development, density
and land value. Brueckner (1986) conducted a formal anal-
ysis, establishing that a split-rate tax increased the “level” of
improvements per acre. In a general equilibrium model, Di-
Masi (1987) concluded that increasing the land rate relative
to the building rate decreases rents and housing prices both
overall and at each distance from the city center, and increases
population density at all locations within the city. Resident
welfare, in terms of aﬀordable housing and wage level, was
found to be optimal when land was taxed at three times the
rate on improvements. Brueckner and Kim (2003) evaluated
the spatial eﬀects of the conventional property tax and found
that when the elasticity of substitution between housing and
other goods is high, a higher property tax causes denser devel-
opment and more compact city size. When the elasticity is
low, the higher tax decreases density and causes the city area
to expand. ăey also considered replacement of the property
tax with a revenue-neutral switch to a land tax and concluded
that the city area would shrink under such a scenario. Song
and Zenou (2006) also developed a model showing that in-
creasing the property tax results in a smaller city area. ăeir
research included an empirical analysis of several urban areas
in the United States, which demonstrated that the cities with
higher property taxes had developed more compactly.
A signiđcant body of empirical research has been directed
at the Pennsylvania applications and particularly on Pitts-
burgh, which has been the largest and most visible example.
ăe most comprehensive study of split-rate property taxation
in Pittsburgh was conducted by Oates and Schwab (1997).
ăe research sought to explain the sharp increase in commer-
cial construction in the 1980s compared to the previous two
decades, while most similar cities in the region saw a substan-
tial drop. In 1976, Pittsburgh began to raise its land tax: from
twice the rate levied on buildings, the land tax rate ultimately
reached nearly six times the building rate. However, there was
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Table 1: Pennsylvania cities with split-rate property taxes, 2008.
Split-rate Land Building Tax rate Assessment Assessment
City tax adopted tax rate tax rate ratio base year ratio
Aliquippa 1988 81.00 11.40 7.11 1982 50%
Allentown 1997 50.38 10.72 4.70 1991 50%
Altoona 2002 230.31 14.56 15.82 1958 75%
Clairton 1989 28.00 2.22 12.61 2002 100%
DuBois 1991 89.00 3.00 29.67 1989 25%
Duquesne 1985 19.00 11.47 1.66 2002 100%
Ebensburg 2000 27.50 7.50 3.67 2005 100%
Harrisburg 1975 28.67 4.78 6.00 2002 100%
Lock Haven 1991 96.79 16.97 5.70 1995 60%
McKeesport 1980 16.50 4.26 3.87 2002 100%
New Castle 1982 24.51 6.93 3.54 2003 100%
Scranton 1913 103.15 22.43 4.60 1973 100%
Steelton 2000 12.00 12.00 1.00 2002 100%
Titusville 1990 59.16 19.00 3.11 1971 75%
Washington 1985 82.63 3.50 23.61 1985 25%
Source: List of cities from King and Nesbit (2007); 2008 tax rates from the respective county
assessment oﬃces; base years and assessment ratios from the Pennsylvania State Tax Equal-
ization Board.
also signiđcant latent demand for oﬃce space that other cities
did not experience, and beginning in 1980 a three-year abate-
ment of the building tax was available for new construction.
In light of these factors, Oates and Schwab concluded that
raising the land tax was not the primary cause of the develop-
ment increase, but that it was a signiđcant enabling factor. ăe
primary motivation for increasing the land rate was a revenue
shortfall, and raising any other tax would have introduced dis-
incentives that might have had an adverse eﬀect on develop-
ment. Other studies (Bourassa 1987;Cord 1983) found some
correlation between the split-rate tax and increased develop-
ment, but determined that the eﬀect was not consistent across
property types and identiđed other conditions that could have
sparked an increase in construction in the city. Weir and
Peters (1986) determined that the higher rate on land still
amounted to too low a carrying charge to factor into devel-
opment decisions.
WhenBourassa (1990) extendedhis Pittsburgh study to in-
clude two other locations, he found that the tax on buildings
had a signiđcant inverse relationship to the amount of new
construction, but that increasing the tax on land had no sig-
niđcant eﬀect. Plassmann and Tideman (2000) established
that the tax diﬀerential had a statistically signiđcant eﬀect on
construction value and on the number of building permits is-
sued, but not on the value per permit. Although their model
did not evaluate land and building rates separately, their re-
sults indicate that increasing the tax diﬀerential (either by re-
ducing the rate on buildings or by increasing the rate on land)
leads to more construction. A more recent empirical study of
Pennsylvania applicationswas conducted byBanzhaf andLav-
ery (2008), who separated density from dwelling size, noting
that increasing the investment ratio of capital to land could re-
sult in larger housing units rather than more units in a given
area. If the dwelling size eﬀect were greater than the density
eﬀect, the result would be a decrease in development inten-
sity and a more sprawling city. ăeir results indicated that the
number of rooms per unit of land area increased in cities with
a split tax, and the dwelling size eﬀect was minimal. ăe den-
sity eﬀect was greater, leading the researchers to conclude that
adopting a split-rate taxwould increase the number of housing
units in a given area and lead to less sprawling development.
Researchers have also considered the administrative and
political ramiđcations of split-rate taxation. Hartzok (1997)
suggested that the transition should be gradual, with no more
than 10–20 percent of the tax burden shiĕed from buildings
to land in a given year. A revenue-neutral shiĕ would prevent
the public from falsely associating the split rate with a tax in-
crease. Equally important to the success of a split-rate tax is
the accurate, timely and fair assessment of land values. Mills
(1998) argued that government lacks both the incentive and
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the skill to predict the market value of a parcel of land under
its optimal use. However, even if signiđcant errors aremade in
land value assessment, economic eﬃciency gains are still likely
with a split-rate tax as long as estimates of total property value
are accurate (Chapman et al. 2009). One possible (but ex-
pensive) way for assessors to determine accurate land values
would be to purchase property at market value, demolish any
improvements and resell the vacant parcels (Anas 1998). If
the tax is based on land values under optimal use, zoning and
other restrictions limit the ability of property owners to use
land more intensively. Finally, taxing land at a high enough
percentage of its value might cause owners to simply abandon
it, and the government usually has no interest in assuming the
role of landlord.
4 Data
A simulation was created to examine how development inten-
sity would be aﬀected by raising the tax on land and reducing
the tax onbuildings in three samplemunicipalities in theTwin
Cities metropolitan area. ăe đrst data set considered for this
analysis was the parcel đle created by theMetropolitan Coun-
cilƲ (the Twin Cities’ regional planning organization), which
includes land areas and estimated market values for land and
buildings. Building areas are included for some, but not all, of
the seven counties in the metropolitan area, and then only for
residential properties; therefore, the sample size would have
been severely restricted if building size were used as a depen-
dent variable. Another limitation of the parcel data is that the
values for land and buildings are estimates, and since no juris-
diction currently taxes them separately, there is no incentive
for the assessors to emphasize the accuracy of the land values
as long as the total property values are accurate.
In order to simulate separate tax rates for land and build-
ings, more reliable land valuations were needed. A hedonic
pricing model for residential property in Hennepin County,
which includes the threemunicipalities studied, had been cre-
ated as part of a previous project (Iacono and Levinson 2009).
ăe independent variables in that model were categorized ac-
cording to whether they aﬀected the value of the parcel (e.g.
neighborhood factors, school quality, accessibility) or of the
structure (e.g. age, number of bedrooms and bathrooms).
Sources for the data used to create the model included single-
family residential sales data from theMinnesotaMultiple List-
ing Service (see Iacono and Levinson 2009), tract-level U.S.
Census data (US Bureau of Census 2000), and school district
Ʋ Available to governmental or academic interests fromMetroGIS, http:
//www.datafinder.org/catalog.
accountability data from the Minnesota Department of Edu-
cation 2008. ăis model was used to determine the average
land value in each census block as a proportion of total prop-
erty value. ăe proportion was then applied to the total mar-
ket value as estimated by the county assessors and given in the
parcel data set. Because houses and the land on which they sit
are almost always sold together, there is plenty of market data
to corroborate these estimates and they are assumed to be reli-
able. In contrast, sales of vacant lots occur rarely enough that
it is not always possible to use sales data for similar parcels to
determine accurate land values independent of any structures.
ăe resulting distribution of land values is shown in Figure 1.
ăe Metropolitan Council’s major highways data setƳ was
used to calculate variables representing the distance from the
center of each block to the nearest Interstate and major high-
way. ăe distances to downtown Minneapolis (intersection
of Nicollet Avenue and Seventh Street) and downtown Saint
Paul (intersection of Seventh Street East and Cedar Street)
were also computed. Accessibility measures, expressed in
terms of the population and employment reachable within
30 minutes by car, were available for each 1990 Metropolitan
Council transportation analysis zone (TAZ) from an earlier
project (El-Geneidy and Levinson 2006).
Since building size data was not available in the parcel data
for most of the area, development intensity was modeled in
terms of housing units and commercial Ĕoor space per unit of
land area. Block-level housing unit counts were taken from
2000 U.S. Census data. Employment for each block in 2000
was determined by distributing retail, non-retail and total em-
ployment counts in each 2000 Metropolitan Council TAZ
among the included blocks using proportions derived from
2005 data from the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dy-
namics program of the U.S. Census Bureau (Levinson et al.
2010). Block-level counts from this source were aggregated
to the TAZ level, and each block was assumed to contain the
same proportion of jobs in the TAZ in 2000 as in 2005.
Among the issues that arise from the level of aggregation
used is that the city and county are not the only jurisdictions
that levy property taxes. Additional taxes are levied by school
districts, đre protection districts, watersheds and for other
special purposes. In the process of deciding on the appropri-
ate location and intensity of construction, a developer would
consider the total property tax liability, not just that portion
charged by the city. Any eﬀect of a split municipal rate on de-
velopment would be muted by the continuation of the con-
ventional tax by other entities. Only city and county taxes
were included in the analysis, but any eﬀect of a split munici-
Ƴ Available fromMetroGIS, www.datafinder.org/catalog.
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Figure 1: Regional distribution of land values (m2), calculated by applying the land proportion of total property value in each
Census block from the hedonic model to assessors’ estimates of total value.
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pal rate on development would be muted by the continuation
of the conventional tax by other entities. Also, aggregating
the building values introduces the assumption that the aver-
age housing unit size and the building quality in terms of the
average construction cost per unit remain đxed when the tax
rates vary. ăis is not necessarily true, but is not unreason-
able and would be consistent with previous empirical research
(Banzhaf and Lavery 2008).
ăe employment count in each block was converted to de-
veloped Ĕoor area using conversion factors based on those that
HennepinCounty assumed in a đscal impact model for devel-
opment in its northwest corridor, which were 400 sq. ĕ. per
retail job, 250 sq. ĕ. per professional job and 500 sq. ĕ. per in-
dustrial job. Because these are rough estimates and this analy-
sis was conducted inmetric units, 40, 25 and 50 squaremeters
were used. Employment was divided into industrial and com-
mercial categories proportionally using land areas taken from
2005 Metropolitan Council land use data. Agricultural land
was included with industrial land to compute density, but was
subtracted from the area used to apportion employment be-
cause it would otherwise have produced an unreasonably high
number of industrial jobs.
ăe analysis assumed that land would remain in its cur-
rent use, and that existing zoning regulations would remain
in place, if a split-rate tax were adopted. Residential density
was computed by dividing the number of housing units by
the area in each block zoned for residential use, and nonres-
idential density by dividing developed Ĕoor area by the sum
of commercial and industrial land area. ăe total area consid-
ered is less than the total land area in each block, as certain
areas unlikely to develop—such as parks, cemeteries, vehicu-
lar rights-of-way and open water—were not included. Blocks
with no residential areawere not considered for the residential
model, and blocks with no commercial or industrial develop-
ment were leĕ out of the nonresidential model. Blocks with
no development or no parcel records were not used in either
model.
5 Methodology
ăe demand to develop a parcel of land is assumed to depend
on the parcel’s accessibility andon the cost of development, in-
cluding property taxes. Transportation access aﬀects residen-
tial and nonresidential properties in diﬀerent ways: a desir-
able business location is one that can be reached easily by both
workers and customers, with retail businesses especially drawn
to locations with high traﬃc and high visibility; a desirable
residential location, on the other hand, is one with access to
jobs and services, but low impacts from negative externalities
of transportation such as noise and air pollution. Because of
these diﬀerences, and because the qualitative criteria involved
in selecting a business location are diﬀerent from those evalu-
ated in a house purchase, two separate models were created.
Property tax rates for the year 2008 were obtained for each
city and township in the metropolitan area from the web sites
of the relevant county assessment oﬃces. ăe blocks were
thenmatchedwithmunicipalities using a geographic informa-
tion system (GIS) to determine the tax rate eﬀective in each
block. A correlation was established between development
density and municipal property tax rate, but since no local
government in the area uses a split-rate tax, an alternate ap-
proach was necessary to separate the eﬀects of the land and
structures components of the tax. Variables were deđned to
represent the costs of land and residential and commercial de-
velopment, including the tax. ăis allowed the land tax rate to
be adjusted separately from the rate on buildings. To place the
tax and the cost of acquiring land in the same temporal terms,
the current values of city and county property taxes were com-
puted using Equations 1 and 2.
VL =

P
VL
0.07
(1)
VS =

P
VL
0.07
(2)
ăe symbol  represents the tax rate; L and S denote the
taxes on land and structures, respectively. In the base case us-
ing a conventional property tax, L = S = . ăe seven
percent discount rate was obtained from Oﬃce of Manage-
ment and Budget recommendations (Oﬃce of Management
and Budget 1992) for beneđt-cost analyses of federal invest-
ments. Once the current values of city and county taxes were
determined, the unit costs of land, housing and nonresidential
Ĕoor area were computed for each block using Equations 3–5.
ăe cost of land CL given by Eq. 3 is used in both models.
Eq. 4 deđnes the residential development cost CH per hous-
ing unit, and Eq. 5 gives the nonresidential development cost
CJ per square meter of Ĕoor area. As with the conversion of
employment to developed Ĕoor area above, the total structure
value in each block is distributed proportionally using the land
area in each block devoted to each use. ăe symbolAD repre-
sents the total developed area, AR is the area zoned for resi-
dential development and AN is the area reserved for nonresi-
dential uses.
CL =
P
VL+VcityL
+VcountyL
Land area
(3)
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CH =
 P
VS +VcityS
+VcountyS
 
AR=AD

Number of units
(4)
CJ =
 P
VS +VcityS
+VcountyS
 
AN=AD

Developed Ĕoor area
(5)
ăe residential model is given by Eq. 6 and the nonresiden-
tial model by Eq. 7. ăe dependent variables IR and IN in-
dicate residential and nonresidential density, respectively, in
terms of housing units per squaremeter of land and developed
Ĕoor area per square meter of land. ăe distances d to the
Minneapolis and Saint Paul central business districts and to
the nearest major highway centerline are straight lines. CL,
CH and CJ are the cost variables, including the tax rates, as
calculated by Eqs. 3, 4 and 5. If the costs for developing resi-
dential and nonresidential properties were independent, some
cross-elasticity might be observed, but the way they are de-
đned results in collinearity. Accessibility represents the pop-
ulation and number of jobs reachable within 30 minutes by
car. Distances were calculated in kilometers and costs in thou-
sands of dollars. Summary statistics for the residential model
are given in Table 2 and for the nonresidential model in Ta-
ble 3.
ln(IR) = f (CL,CH ,ddowntowns,dhighway,Accessibility) (6)
ln(IN ) = f (CL,CJ ,ddowntowns,dhighway,Accessibility) (7)
Tax rates for prediction purposes were calculated assuming
revenue neutrality using Eqs. 8 and 9, a system similar to that
used by Cho et al. (2008). ăe levels of revenue raised by ex-
isting municipal property taxes were taken as đxed, necessary
and optimal for provision of public services in the cities exam-
ined.
Equation 8 calculates the revenue R generated by the exist-
ing property tax at rate  on the land L and structures S on all
parcels in each city. ăe proposed land tax rate L and struc-
ture tax rate S together must yield this amount. ăe variable
 in Equation 9 represents the diﬀerential between land and
building rates and must be input. To test a variety of rate dif-
ferentials similar to those currently in use in Pennsylvania, 
values of 2, 5, 10 and 20 were tested. ăe two equations to-
gether were then used to determine revenue-neutral test rates
for land and buildings.
R= (L+ S) = LL+SS (8)
L = S (9)
6 Results
ăe results from the residential regression are displayed in Ta-
ble 4 and the results from the nonresidential regression in Ta-
ble 5. In the residential model, the parameters on all variables
are statistically signiđcant at the 99 percent conđdence level.
ăe signs on the cost variables are as expected, with increased
density associated with higher land costs and lower structure
costs. ăe expected negative signs also appear on the parame-
ters for the distance and accessibility variables. Residents are
expected to concentrate in areas with access to large numbers
of jobs and commercial development, and in areas with less ac-
cess to population that could represent competition for those
opportunities.
In the nonresidential model, the cost variables and the dis-
tances to the downtowns are statistically signiđcant at the 99
percent conđdence level. As in the residential model, the land
and building cost variables are both signiđcant and display the
expected signs. Although they are not statistically signiđcant,
the parameters on the other variables display the anticipated
signs, except the accessibility to population. At the census
block level, population and employment are highly and in-
versely correlated, due to the Census Bureau’s goal of making
blocks as homogenous as possible.
ăe equations resulting from the regressionswere then used
to predict the eﬀects of a split-rate tax in Minneapolis, Rich-
đeld and Bloomington. ăese municipalities are adjacent and
were chosen to represent the existing development intensity
typical in a central city, an inner-ring suburb and an outer sub-
urb. ăe revenue-neutral tax rates calculated for the analysis
using the procedure explained above are displayedwith the av-
erage predicted intensity changes for each city in Table 6. Pre-
dicted changes are displayed as a percentage of the modeled
intensity under the existing tax rates. ăe percentages shown
are averages of the projected density increase in each census
block in each city, weighted by the area in the block devoted
to residential or nonresidential development.
ăe spatial distribution of the predicted increases in devel-
opment intensity for residential property is presented in Fig-
ures ?? and ?? and for nonresidential development by Figures
?? and ?? for land : structures tax ratios of 2 : 1 and 5 : 1.
ăe intensity increase is most pronounced in Minneapolis,
where the necessary tax rate on land is highest. Within Min-
neapolis, land values are higher in the southern half of the city,
so this is where the greatest increase in residential density is
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Table 2: Summary statistics for census blocks included in the residential model.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Median Min Max
City tax rate 34.71 12.13 32.53 3.98 102.82
County tax rate 35.86 6.28 38.57 25.20 44.02
ln housing units per unit land area (m2) −7.38 1.33 −7.19 −14.69 4.15
Land cost per square meter ($1000) 1.09 1.00 0.90 0.00 31.55
Structure cost per unit ($1000) 765.96 1466.14 538.86 0.00 55 355.58
Distance to downtownMinneapolis (km) 19.93 11.96 18.14 0.10 63.56
Distance to downtown St. Paul (km) 22.93 13.49 20.77 0.09 75.57
Distance to nearest highway (km) 1.75 2.08 1.11 0.00 17.36
ln population accessible in 30 min 13.96 0.69 14.24 10.68 14.63
ln employment accessible in 30 min 13.45 0.88 13.81 9.38 14.16
Note:Costs are present values of perpetual ownership; distances are calculated from block
centroids.
Table 3: Summary statistics for census blocks included in the nonresidential model.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Median Min Max
City tax rate 35.66 12.15 31.97 3.98 102.82
County tax rate 36.37 6.27 38.57 25.20 44.02
ln Ĕoor area per unit land area (m2) −2.39 2.20 −2.37 −11.48 14.20
Land cost per square meter ($1000) 1.29 3.54 0.75 0.00 101.86
Structure cost per square meter ($1000) 17.97 69.63 3.77 0.00 3270.83
Distance to downtownMinneapolis, (km) 18.60 11.97 16.40 0.11 61.66
Distance to downtown St. Paul, (km) 21.69 13.77 19.38 0.06 74.03
Distance to nearest highway, (km) 1.33 1.90 0.75 0.00 16.08
ln population accessible in 30 min 14.03 0.68 14.30 10.68 14.63
ln employment accessible in 30 min 13.53 0.84 13.89 9.38 14.16
Note:Costs are present values of perpetual ownership; distances are calculated from block
centroids.
shown. Nonresidential increases follow a less obvious pattern,
but concentrations are evident in downtownMinneapolis and
along corridors such asHennepin andNicollet Avenues, espe-
cially when the split becomes larger. As the signs on the land
and building cost parameters indicate, a ratio of 5 : 1 results
in greater density than a ratio of 2 : 1. ăe resulting maps for
ratios of 10 : 1 and 20 : 1 are not displayed but indicate still
greater development intensity.
ăis model represents a partial equilibrium state of devel-
opment in the cities analyzed. It demonstrates the supply of
development that property owners would prefer to provide
within the city limits given changes in the property tax sys-
tem, but does not account for demand from tenants for more
leasable space. Presumably, demand would increase with sup-
ply—to a point. Compelling builders to providemore units in
order to cover increased land taxes and take advantage of the
reduced cost of building would create a market favorable to
renters. However, whether demand would increase enough to
justify the predicted density shown in the đgures is not at all
certain. Moreover, whether the inĔux of businesses and res-
idents would come from elsewhere within the metropolitan
area or from outside it remains unknown.
ăe model does not consider the cost of building in other
citieswhenpredicting the eﬀect of tax changes in a speciđc city
on development density. If only a few cities within a larger
metropolitan region were to adopt a split-rate tax and then
see a spike in building, that eﬀect might erode as neighbor-
ing cities followed their example. ăe scale of development
in downtownMinneapolis is unique within the metropolitan
area, but typical levels of new construction in Richđeld and
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Table 4: Residential model results.
Variable Parameter Std. Error t Statistic Sig.
Intercept −4.188 12 0.483 45 −8.66 **
Land cost per square meter 0.468 42 0.006 41 73.13 **
Structure cost per unit −0.000 282 7 0.000 003 65 −77.53 **
Distance to downtownMinneapolis −0.013 78 0.001 35 −10.20 **
Distance to downtown St. Paul −0.016 03 0.000 756 9 −21.18 **
Distance to nearest highway −0.147 86 0.003 16 −46.78 **
ln population accessible in 30 min. −0.581 63 0.063 38 −9.18 **
ln employment accessible in 30 min. 0.4111 0.042 74 9.62 **
Note:Dependent variable= ln(housing units perm2). R2 = 0.51,n = 31511. ** =signiđcant
at 99% conđdence level.
Table 5:Nonresidential model results.
Variable Parameter Std. Error t Statistic Sig.
Intercept 0.122 13 2.053 22 0.06
Land cost per square meter 0.090 38 0.006 26 14.44 **
Structure cost per square meter −0.0114 0.000 308 73 −36.92 **
Distance to downtownMinneapolis −0.041 96 0.005 09 −8.24 **
Distance to downtown St. Paul −0.015 42 0.003 12 −4.95 **
Distance to nearest highway −0.0051 0.013 42 −0.38
ln population accessible in 30 min. −0.346 14 0.276 07 −1.25
ln employment accessible in 30 min. 0.262 42 0.182 54 1.44
Note:Dependent variable = ln(Ĕoor area (m2) per land area (m2)). R2 = 0.27,n = 7679. **
= signiđcant at 99% conđdence level.
Bloomington could be replicated in any of several other sub-
urbs. Any resulting density change would in turn aﬀect the
optimal distribution of land uses within the city, as well as
land values. If, for example, commercial development were
to intensify more quickly than residential development, zones
could be shiĕed from commercial to residential uses. ăe
change in land value produced by a higher land tax may ne-
cessitate adjustments to the tax rates until a revenue-neutral
equilibrium is reached.
Future research should address several limitations of the
present analysis in order to produce a better model. First and
foremost, the eﬀects of the tax should be separated from the
eﬀects of land and structures pricing. ăis would illustrate
more directly the eﬀects of changing tax structure and also al-
low for variation in construction quality and dwelling size. If
building size data were made available at the parcel level, the
assumption that land will remain in its current use could be
relaxed, and the residential and nonresidential models could
be combined. However, some level of aggregation would still
be necessary for prediction purposes, since the process of de-
veloping each parcel is unique, and accurately predicting the
future of any speciđc parcel is not feasible. Another improve-
ment to the model’s accuracy could be made by including the
total property tax liability, rather than just the city and county
rates. Finally, development intensity could be evaluated as a
proportion of some maximum allowable value, since zoning
laws limiting the intensity of land use could remain in place if
a split-rate tax were adopted.
7 Conclusion
Split-rate property taxes are more eﬀective than conventional
property taxes at capturing value accruing to a property from
external sources such as transportation access, and also reduce
taxes on the portion of value created by the eﬀorts of the
owner. ăe owners of parcels adjacent to transportation facil-
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Table 6: Predicted changes in development intensity.
Land Bldg. Pred. Change Pred. Change
City Ratio Rate Rate (Residential) (Nonresidential)
Minneapolis 1:1 56.286 56.286 — —
2:1 65.523 32.761 16.57% 5.89%
5:1 72.678 14.536 35.54% 24.24%
10:1 75.424 7.542 47.45% 48.84%
20:1 76.876 3.844 56.20% 73.30%
Richđeld 1:1 37.910 37.910 — —
2:1 44.165 22.082 7.67% 4.01%
5:1 49.017 9.803 14.04% 7.56%
10:1 50.880 5.088 16.59% 9.03%
20:1 51.866 2.593 17.97% 9.84%
Bloomington 1:1 31.966 31.966 — —
2:1 37.424 18.712 6.48% 2.64%
5:1 41.696 8.339 11.92% 5.52%
10:1 43.345 4.335 14.11% 6.97%
20:1 44.220 2.211 15.30% 7.84%
Note:ăe rates as shown apply not to market value but to tax capacity as deđned
by Minnesota Statute 273.13. Tax capacity of residential property is deđned as
one percent of the đrst $500,000 in market value and 1.25 percent of remaining
value. Tax capacity for commercial property is 1.5 percent of the đrst $150,000
and two percent of remaining value.
ities would pay a larger share of the costs of infrastructure im-
provements than the owners of distant properties that would
beneđt less. As long as assessmentswere kept up todate, the in-
creased value would be captured automatically in the property
tax bill and there would be no need to assess additional fees.
ăe split-rate tax is perhaps the broadest value capture strat-
egy because it applies throughout a jurisdiction and reĔects
changes in land value generated by sources other than trans-
portation improvements. If the goal is to leave other value un-
touched, a more local mechanism may be preferred.
By inĔuencing developer incentives, a split-rate property
tax would be likely to lead to more dense development. ăe
higher tax on land would require developers to build more
in order to recoup their expenses, while the lower tax on im-
provements would remove a disincentive for building. ăe re-
sults of the models described in this paper indicate that these
eﬀects would obtain for both residential and nonresidential
development, in the central city as well as in the suburbs. Rais-
ing the tax on land has a greater eﬀect than reducing the tax on
buildings in both models. ăe predicted increase in density is
greatest where the property tax rate is high, where land value is
high andwhere existing density is low relative to land value. In
practice, however, the eﬀects would be contingent on the de-
mand from tenants for more development and on regulations
governing land use. Because the value of land independent of
structures is diﬃcult to determine, the largest technical chal-
lenge to split-rate taxation is the accurate assessment of land
value.
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